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HE sixty-eighth session of the legislature enacted more changes in
Title 2, Parent and Child, of the Family Code than has any other
legislature since the enactment of title 2 in 1973.' The changes in-
volve both substance and form. The two pieces of legislation that received
the most publicity, although they may not be of the greatest practical sig-
nificance, are the Uniform Child Custody Jurisdiction Act 2 and the new
provision allowing garnishment of wages to pay child support. 3
The enactment of the Texas version of the Uniform Child Custody Ju-
risdiction Act (UCCJA),4 while not actually changing Texas practice,
should, because of its new name, provide needed credibility for Texas
judgments in interstate custody decisions.5 Texas courts have customarily
deferred to other jurisdictions' valid custody judgments, 6 and the title of
the UCCJA should make certain that other states will give due credit to
our courts' decisions. Our continuing jurisdiction statute keeps its Texas
flavor because it retains the provision that a court may not modify a cus-
tody decision without the agreement of the parties if the child and the
managing conservator have established a residence in a state other than
Texas and have been absent for over six months. 7 The wording of the
* A.B., Oberlin College; J.D., Southern Methodist University. Professor of Law,
Southern Methodist University.
i. Title 2, Parent and Child, ch. 543, 1973 Tex. Gen. Laws 1411.
2. Ch. 160, 1983 Tex. Gen. Laws 691.
3. Act of June 17, 1983, ch. 402, 1983 Tex. Gen. Laws 2169 (amending Family Code to
provide for garnishment of wages for child support); Tex. H.R.J. Res. 1, 68th Leg. (1983)
(proposing state constitutional amendment permitting wage garnishment for child support).
4. TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. §§ 11.51-.75 (Vernon Pam. Supp. 1975-1983).
5. See Solender, Family Law: Parent and Child, Annual Survey of Texas Law, 37 Sw.
L.J. 111, 123 (1983).
6. See, e.g., Wise v. Yates, 639 S.W.2d 460 (Tex. 1982) (issuing writ of mandamus to
uphold Virginia order of custody to wife); Lamphere v. Chrisman, 554 S.W.2d 935, 938
(Tex. 1977) (beyond distinctions in statutes, Texas recognizes no difference between valid
Texas custody orders and those of other states); Perry v. Ponder, 604 S.W.2d 306, 318-19
(Tex. Civ. App.-Dallas 1980, no writ) (other state's custody decree entitled to full faith and
credit regarding facts at time of decree); Kellogg v. Kellogg, 559 S.W.2d 126, 128 (Tex. Civ.
App.-Texarkana 1977, no writ) (when asked to give full faith and credit to another state's
proceedings Texas court cannot collaterally inquire into other state's jurisdiction over party
if question of jurisdiction was litigated there).
7. TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 11.53(d) (Vernon Pam. Supp. 1975-1983). Section 11.53(d)
incorporates the repealed § 11.052 exceptions to continuing jurisdiction. Id.
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Texas UCCJA is not identical to the standard version of the UCCJA. The
family practitioner dealing with another state's version of the UCCJA
therefore should carefully compare it with the Texas version. The nature
of the problem will then determine which law will apply.
One of the purposes of the UCCJA is to deter abductions of children. 8
Although federal courts have begun to establish a common law tort cause
of action for the wrongful taking of children from their lawful custodians, 9
the legislature, uncertain of the sufficiency of the courts' solution, added
Chapter 36, Civil Liability for Interference with Child Custody,' 0 to the
Family Code. This chapter defines the tort" and sets out the damages
available to a custodian whose custody has been wrongfully interrupted.'
2
Continued expansion of the common law is permissible since the statute
specifically does not preempt the possibility of other remedies, especially
those that may be fashioned for the child who has been abducted.' 3
Enforcement of child support orders is a national problem, and Texas is
not excepted. 14 The legislature enacted an important new alternative to
standard collection methods by adding a Family Code provision for the
voluntary assignment of wages by the obligor. I' In addition, standby leg-
islation allowed for the involuntary assignment of wages 16 should the con-
stitutional amendment permitting such assignment pass.17 Since the voters
overwhelmingly endorsed the provision in the November 8, 1983, election,
Texas can now enforce child support orders through wage assignments. 18
These changes should reduce the number of persons found in contempt for
failure to pay support, because automatic deductions from wages will pre-
8. Id. § 11.51(a)(5).
9. See, e.g., Bennett v. Bennett, 682 F.2d 1039 (D.C. Cir. 1982) (federal courts' diver-
sity jurisdiction extends to tort suits over wrongful taking of child); Wasserman v. Wasser-
man, 671 F.2d 832 (4th Cir. 1982) (tort claims arising from abduction of child are outside
domestic relations exception to diversity jurisdiction); Fenslage v. Dawkins, 629 F.2d 1107
(5th Cir. 1980) (mental suffering damages recoverable under Texas law against wrongful
abductors of child).
10. TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. §§ 36.01-.08 (Vernon Pam. Supp. 1975-1983).
11. Id. § 36.02. One who takes or retains possession of or who conceals the wherea-
bouts of a child in violation of a court order regarding possessory interest may be liable to
the party deprived of that interest. Id.
12. Id. § 36.03. Damages include the actual expenses of locating and recovering the
child and bringing suit as well as the value of mental suffering and exemplary damages for
malice. Id.
13. Id. § 36.06.
14. Seventy-five percent of children in single-parent families in the United States re-
ceive no support from noncustodial parents, and the noncompliance rate for court-ordered
child support payments to clients of the Texas Department of Human Resources is 70%.
LEAGUE OF WOMEN VOTERS OF TEXAS EDUCATION FUND, FACTS AND ISSUES, CHILD SUP-
PORT ENFORCEMENT IN TEXAS (1983).
15. TEX. FAM.CODE ANN. § 14.091(a)-(o) (Vernon Pam. Supp. 1975-1983).
16. Act of June 17, 1983, ch. 402, § 2, 1983 Tex. Gen. Laws 2169, 2172-73.
17. "No current wages for personal service shall ever be subject to garnishment, except
for the enforcement of court-ordered child support payments." TEX. CONST. art. XVI, § 28
(italicized words added by passage of Proposition 6 in election of Nov. 8, 1983).
18. The legislature has also provided for the deduction of child support payments from
unemployment benefits. Act of June 19, 1983, ch. 527, § 5, 1983 Tex. Gen. Laws 3064, 3072-
74 (codified at TEX. REV. CIV. STAT. ANN. art. 5221b--13(c)-(d) (Vernon Supp. 1984).
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vent obligors from falling behind in their payments. Additionally, in an
attempt to promote uniformity in amounts payable for support, the legisla-
ture spelled out the factors to be considered in establishing the amount of
support and recommended the use of formulas and guidelines. 19 Courts
may also publish local rules pertaining to schedules and formulas, 20 so that
in a county having a number of district courts, various support orders
based on similar facts will be approximately equal.
The legislature lengthened the statute of limitations for paternity actions
to twenty years and made it uniform for all illegitimates. 2' The United
States Supreme Court undoubtedly would uphold the constitutionality of
this statute.22 In addition the legislature made a significant change in the
case law rule that had presumed that a child born of the marriage is legiti-
mate.23 A husband may now deny paternity and, despite the possibility of
access, may use blood tests to prove his nonpaternity so that he will not be
required to pay child support. 24
In addition to enacting the UCCJA the legislature made a number of
substantive changes in the law pertaining to custody. When appointing
managing and possessory conservators, a court must now specify in its or-
der the times and conditions for possession of or access to the child.
25
Courts may also establish and publish local rules pertaining to schedules
and guidelines for possession of or access to a child.26 Additionally, the
legislature significantly expanded the rights of grandparents. 27 The ap-
pointment of a managing conservator is no longer a prerequisite for a suit
by a grandparent requesting access to a grandchild.
The Family Code now prohibits courts from issuing temporary orders
changing conservatorship during the pendency of a hearing on a motion to
permanently modify conservatorship unless the child is in danger.28 This
measure should promote stability and prevent a motion for modification
from becoming a de facto change in conservatorship because of the delay
19. TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 14.05(a) (Vernon Pam. Supp. 1975-1983).
20. Id.
21. Id. § 13.01.
22. See infra notes 44-50 and accompanying text (discussion of Pickett v. Brown, 103 S.
Ct. 2199, 76 L. Ed. 2d 372 (1983)).
23. Joplin v. Meadows, 623 S.W.2d 442, 443-44 (Tex. App.-Texarkana 1981, no writ).
24. TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 12.06 (Vernon Pam. Supp. 1975-1983). The husband must
raise the question of paternity by an express denial in his pleadings. Id. This statute is a
legislative statement of disapproval of the results in Clark v. Clark, 643 S.W.2d 795, 797
(Tex. App.-Fort Worth 1982, no writ), and Magana v. Magana, 576 S.W.2d 131, 134 (Tex.
Civ. App.--Corpus Christi 1978, no writ), in which the courts denied the husbands' motions
for blood tests to establish their paternity or nonpaternity and ordered them to pay child
support.
25. TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 14.03(a) (Vernon Pam. Supp. 1975-1983).
26. Id. § 14.03(b).
27. Id. § 14.03(e). This is a mislettered section, since § 14.03 now contains three subsec-
tions (e). It is the first subsection (e) that expands the rights of grandparents. This statute is,
among other things, intended to repeal case law that has denied the parents of a deceased
child a cause of action to obtain access to their grandchildren. See In re K.L.M., 609 S.W.2d
314 (Tex. Civ. App.-Eastland 1980, no writ); Barrientos v. Garza, 559 S.W.2d 399, 399-400
(Tex. Civ. App.-Dallas 1977, no writ).
28. TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 14.08(g) (Vernon Pam. Supp. 1975-1983).
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in hearing the motion. The statute, however, now recognizes a voluntary
de facto modification. 29 The provision can be effective, for example,
where the managing conservator has permitted the possessory conservator
to keep the child on a more or less permanent basis, though without prior
court approval of the arrangement. Recognition of a voluntary de facto
modification is in accord with the policy of promoting agreements between
the parties.
The legislature has apparently significantly changed its policy of secrecy
concerning the identity of adoptees' natural parents. While continuing the
confidentiality provisions of the Code, 30 the legislature has added require-
ments for the maintenance of detailed background records of the
adoptee. 31 It has also provided in the Human Resources Code32 for the
establishment of a registry of adoptees and their natural parents. Under
this plan, if either party is interested and the other party has consented,
they may be able to make contact without too much difficulty. Since these
provisions became effective January 1, 1984, those who were adopted prior
to this date are not affected.
The numerous other changes in the Family Code include the require-
ment that an attorney ad litem be appointed for an indigent parent who
opposes termination of his parental rights by a governmental entity. 33
Also, the legislature eased the requirements for obtaining temporary or-
ders,34 revised the evidence standards for termination to conform with
court and constitutional requirements, 35 provided for inclusion of social
security numbers in findings related to support orders,36 and required that
a conservator give written notice of changes of his address to all other
parties.37 As an indication of the growing concern for the sexually abused
child, the legislators added a new section pertaining to the giving of testi-
mony by the child. 38 It includes provisions for recording the testimony
prior to trial, transmitting the testimony by closed-circuit television, limit-
ing the persons who may be present, and other measures to protect the
privacy and psychological well-being of the child.39
The legislature also restricted the jurisdiction of the Texas Supreme
Court in custody and support cases. 40 The provision is a logically consis-
tent one since the court's jurisdiction is already restricted in divorce
29. Id. § 14.08(c)(1)(D).
30. Id. § 11.17(b), (d). Note that subsection (d) has been changed so that Travis County
district courts no longer have concurrent jurisdiction with the decree court for purposes of
providing information about the adoption decree.
31. Id. § 16.032 (Health, Social, Educational, and Genetic History Report).
32. TEX. HUM. RES. CODE ANN. §§ 49.001-.023 (Vernon Supp. 1984).
33. TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 11.10(d) (Vernon Pam. Supp. 1975-1983).
34. Id. § 11.1l(b).
35. Id. § ll.15(b)-(c); see Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745 (1982); In re G.M., 596
S.W.2d 846 (Tex. 1980).
36. TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 11.15(b) (Vernon Pam. Supp. 1975-1983).
37. Id. § 14.031.
38. Id. § 11.21.
39. Id.
40. TEX. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 1821(3) (Vernon Supp. 1984).
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cases, 41 where controversies in connection with custody and support usu-
ally arise. Of course the court will continue to have jurisdiction where
decisions conflict on questions of law in the various courts of appeals or
when an appeals court decision conflicts with a decision of the Texas
Supreme Court.42
II. UNITED STATES SUPREME COURT DECISIONS
As this author predicted last year,43 the United States Supreme Court
has decided the constitutionality of a two-year statute of limitations for
paternity actions. The Court in Pickett v. Brown44 unanimously held the
Tennessee two-year statute unconstitutional. 45 The equal protection prob-
lem this statute raised was quite obvious; not only did it distinguish be-
tween legitimate and illegitimate children, but it also differentiated
between illegitimate children who received public assistance and those
who did not.46 Justice Brennan's opinion quoted extensively from Justice
O'Connor's concurring opinion in last term's Mills v. Habluetzel.47 That
concurrence had indicated that some statutes of limitations longer than
one year might also be unconstitutional but had not specified how long a
time would be necessary to make such a statute constitutional. 48 The opin-
ion did note, however, the significance of the fact that paternity statutes
seemed to be "one of the few Texas causes of action not tolled during the
minority of the plaintiff,"49 a situation also true of the Tennessee statute.50
Even in this second decision on the subject, the Court did not explicitly
state what the proper statute of limitations length might be. A strong indi-
cation as to the proper length of time may be found, however, in the
Court's comments on tolling and its memorandum decision in Astemborski
v. Susmarski,51 vacating and remanding a case for further consideration in
light of Pickett. In Astemborski the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania had
held the six-year state statute of limitations constitutional. 52 The Texas
Legislature was wise to take the hint from the Mills decision and revise its
statute of limitations so that no question of its constitutionality could
41. Id.
42. Id. art. 1728(2) (Vernon 1962).
43. Solender, supra note 5, at 112.
44. 103 S. Ct. 2199, 76 L. Ed. 2d 372 (1983).
45. Id. at 2209, 76 L. Ed. 2d at 386 (discussing TENN. CODE ANN. § 36-224(2) (1977)).
46. 103 S. Ct. at 2202, 76 L. Ed. 2d at 377.
47. 456 U.S. 91 (1982) (declaring one-year statute of limitations for establishing pater-
nity unconstitutional).
48. Id. at 102-03 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
49. Id. at 104 (O'Connor, J., concurring). Texas courts have held that for children born
prior to the enactment of TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 13.01 (Vernon Supp. 1984), increasing
the statute of limitation to 20 years, the general four-year limitations rule of TEX. REV. CIv.
STAT. ANN. art. 5529 (Vernon 1958) applies, and that it is tolled during the child's minority
by TEX. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 5535 (Vernon 1958). Perry v. Merritte, 643 S.W.2d 496,
498 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1982, no writ); Texas Dep't of Human Resources v.
Delley, 581 S.W.2d 519, 521 (Tex. Civ. App.-Dallas 1979, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
50. 103 S. Ct. at 2208-09, 76 L. Ed. 2d at 384-85 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
51. 103 S. Ct. 3105, 77 L. Ed. 2d 1360 (1983).
52. 451 A.2d 1012 (Pa. 1982).
19841
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exist. 53
In Martinez v. Bynum 54 the Court sustained the constitutionality of
Texas's school attendance laws.55 Martinez specifically addressed the stat-
utory directive that only bona fide residents of a school district are entitled
to free public school education. 56 If a child resides in a school district for
the primary purpose of attending the public schools, the statute states that
he is not entitled to a tuition-free education. 57 The Court found the resi-
dence requirement to be a bona fide one that "furthers the substantial state
interest in assuring that services provided for its residents are enjoyed only
by residents. s58 The Texas Legislature has provided for stricter enforce-
ment of the residence requirements through changes in the Education
Code 59 and the Probate Code.60
Another decision of interest to Texas attorneys is Lehr v. Robertson .61
The decision is significant because it upholds the constitutionality of a stat-
ute that distinguishes between mothers and putative fathers of illegitimate
children. 62 The Court stressed that the interest protected is "a substantial
relationship between parent and child" 63 and that the father must accept a
measure of responsibility for the child's future to be entitled to constitu-
tional protection.64 In this case the father delayed his attempt to establish
a relationship for two years. The Court deemed this delay to be too long
and therefore sustained the New York court's ruling permitting an adop-
tion without the father's consent.65
During the last term the Court had before it a similar appeal from a
Texas court's decision denying a putative father the right to legitimate his
child in order to prevent its adoption.66 The petitioner contended that the
Texas statute denies putative fathers equal protection because of its dis-
53. TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 13.01 (Vernon Pam. Supp. 1975-1983). Mills, upon re-
mand from the United States Supreme Court, was reversed and remanded for trial. 648
S.W.2d 18 (Tex. App.-Corpus Christi 1983, no writ).
54. 103 S. Ct. 1838, 75 L. Ed. 2d 879 (1983).
55. TEX. EDUC. CODE ANN. § 21.031 (Vernon 1972 & Supp. 1984).
56. Id. § 21.03 1(c).
57. Id. § 21.031(d).
58. 103 S. Ct. at 1842, 75 L. Ed. 2d at 879.
59. Persons who knowingly falsify information on enrollment forms can be liable, for
the period of time the ineligible student was enrolled, for either the maximum tuition
charged by the district or the amount the district has budgeted for each student, whichever is
greater. This liability is in addition to the penalty provisions of the Penal Code. TEX.
EDUC. CODE ANN. § 21.031(g), (h) (Vernon Supp. 1984); see TEX. PENAL CODE ANN.
§ 37.10 (Vernon 1974).
60. A guardian may not be appointed for a minor for the primary purpose of enabling
the minor to establish a residence for enrolling in a school or school district that he is other-
wise ineligible to attend. TEX. PROB. CODE ANN. § 114(e) (Vernon Supp. 1984).
61. 103 S. Ct. 2985, 77 L. Ed. 2d 614 (1983).
62. Id. at 2996, 77 L. Ed. 2d at 630-31 (upholding TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 13.21
(Vernon Pam. Supp. 1975-1983)).
63. 103 S. Ct. at 2996, 77 L. Ed. 2d at 630.
64. Id. at 2993-94, 77 L. Ed. 2d at 627.
65. Id.
66. In re Baby Girl S, 628 S.W.2d 261 (Tex. App.-Eastland 1982), vacated and re-
manded sub nom. Kirkpatrick v. Christian Homes, 103 S. Ct. 1760, 76 L. Ed. 2d 337 (1983).
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tinction between putative fathers and mothers. 67 The Court, instead of
deciding that question, vacated and remanded the case for further pro-
ceedings under Texas law.68 The Texas Supreme Court has held the statu-
tory distinction between mothers and putative fathers constitutional.69
Unless some fact situation arises in which an established relationship is
discriminatorily severed, the courts will likely continue to uphold the stat-
ute in its present form.
III. STATUS
The Texas Supreme Court's decision in Sanchez v. Schindler70 produced
an important new change in tort law relating to the wrongful death of
children. The court overruled decisions dating back to 1877 that had held
that the measure of damages for the wrongful death of a child was limited
to pecuniary loss. 7 1 In rejecting this rule the court agreed that it was
"based on an antiquated concept of the child as an economic asset."'72
Thus, the court extended a parent's right to recover to encompass damages
for the mental anguish caused by the death of a child.73 The court com-
mented that if the pecuniary loss rule were literally applied, the average
child would have a negative worth.74 This ruling conforms Texas law to
modem trends75 and further confirms the importance of children in our
society despite their lack of ability to produce income.
In Sax v. Votteler76 the Texas Supreme Court held that a section of the
Insurance Code77 violated the Texas Constitution. The provision at issue
removed the tolling provisions for minors after age six, thus preventing
minors from bringing medical malpractice suits for injuries sustained dur-
ing their minority. The court relied on the open courts provision of the
67. The statute is quite complex, since "parent" means the mother or a man as to whom
the child is legitimate, TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 11.01(3) (Vernon 1975), and legitimation
requires that the court issue a decree declaring the father a parent based on either the con-
sent of the mother or a finding by the court that legitimation is in the best interests of the
child, id. § 13.21 (Vernon Pam. Supp. 1975-1983). A petition for adoption may not be con-
sidered until after termination of the parent-child relationship, which requires both a statu-
tory basis for termination and a finding that it is in the best interest of the child. Id.
§§ 15.02, 16.03.
68. Kirkpatrick v. Christian Homes, 103 S. Ct. 1760, 76 L. Ed. 2d 337 (1983).
69. In re T.E.T., 603 S.W.2d 793, 797 (Tex.), cert. denied, 450 U.S. 1025 (1980).
70. 651 S.W.2d 249 (Tex. 1983).
71. Id. at 251 n.2; see General Motors Corp. v. Grizzle, 642 S.W.2d 837, 843 (Tex.
App.-Waco 1982, writ dism'd); Green v. Hale, 590 S.W.2d 231, 235 (Tex. Civ. App.-Tyler
1979, no writ); Jasper County Lumber Co. v. McMillan, 188 S.W.2d 731, 732 (Tex. Civ.
App.-Beaumont 1945, writ ref'd).
72. 651 S.W.2d at 251.
73. Id. at 253.
74. Id.
75. Id. at 252-53 nn.3-5.
76. 648 S.W.2d 661 (Tex. 1983).
77. TEX. INS. CODE ANNj. § 5.82(4). This section was repealed by the Medical Liability
and Insurance Improvement Act, ch. 817, § 41.01, 1977 Tex. Gen. Laws 2039, 2064, but
replaced by a similar provision in TEx. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 4590i, § 10.01 (Vernon$upp. 1984).
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Texas Constitution78 and found that the statute denied the child any rem-
edy unless the parents brought suit.79 The court considered this reliance
on the parents unrealistic.8 0 The court found that the restriction on the
child's access to the courts was not only unreasonable when balanced
against the purpose of the statute but that it also abolished a minor's right
to bring a common law cause of action without providing a reasonable
alternative. 8'
Good day care facilities are important for children, and the Texas De-
partment of Human Resources (DHR) is charged with supervising them.
Accordingly, when the DHR found a particular facility in violation of its
registration requirements, it obtained a permanent injunction to prevent
that facility's operation. The court of appeals reversed on a pleading er-
ror.82 The Texas Supreme Court, however, reversed and remanded, find-
ing that the appeals court elevated form over substance by basing its
decision on the failure to find a licensing error when the Department had
intended to complain of a lack of compliance with registration
requirements. 83
The importance of sports in Texas high schools cannot be overesti-
mated. 84 The University Interscholastic League (UIL) tries to regulate the
fairness of competition through rules concerning matters such as training,
financial awards to students, and eligibility. The UIL sanctioned the Har-
din-Jefferson Independent School District for alleged violations of UIL
rules, and the school district obtained a temporary injunction restraining
the enforcement of the sanctions. The appeals court sustained the school
district's position, finding that nothing in the record supported the sanc-
tions and thus that the trial judge did not abuse his discretion in granting
the injunction. 85 The court further held in accordance with prior decisions
that the UIL is not a state agency and, therefore, must post appeal bonds.
86
The UIL was more successful in Niles v. University Interscholastic
League ,87 a suit concerning eligibility. In Niles a student whose parents
had been divorced moved with his mother from the district during the
spring semester. He had played varsity football during the fall semester
and, the following fall, returned to his former high school and rejoined the
78. "All courts shall be open, and every person for an injury done him ... shall have
remedy by due course of law." TEX. CONST. art. I, § 13.
79. 648 S.W.2d at 667.
80. Id. The court noted that the parents themselves could be minors or could be igno-
rant or unconcerned. Id.
81. Id.
82. Wininger v. Department of Human Resources, 653 S.W.2d 376 (Tex. App.-Fort
Worth 1983). The department's pleadings had alleged a licensing, rather than a registration
violation.
83. Department of Human Resources v. Wininger, 657 S.W.2d 783, 784 (Tex. 1983).
84. See McCoy, Perot Tackles a Local Favorite, and the Crowd Roars, Wall St. J., Dec.
15, 1983, at 26, col. 3.
85. University Interscholastic League v. Hardin-Jefferson Indep. School Dist., 648
S.W.2d 770, 772 (Tex. App.-Beaumont 1983, no writ).
86. Id. at 772-73.
87. 715 F.2d 1027 (5th Cir. 1983).
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team. The UIL declared that Niles had violated a rule that requires stu-
dents to be residents of the school district for a year prior to participating
in interscholastic events. The student challenged the rule in federal court
on constitutional grounds, claiming an infringement of his right to travel
freely, an invidious discrimination between himself and children who re-'
side with their parents, and a violation of his fundamental right to partici-
pate in interscholastic sports. Although the federal court held that it had
subject matter jurisdiction since Niles's claims were not patently frivo-
lous, 88 it found no violation of constitutional rights. The court held that
the UIL rule only incidentally infringes upon the right to travel, 89 and
promotes the state interest in equalizing competition without denying
equal protection.90 Additionally, the court found that a student's interest
in interscholastic activities falls outside the protection of due process.91
In In re E. G.M.92 a court held that the accuracy of blood tests that failed
to eliminate the possibility of paternity, when coupled with evidence of
access during the critical period, is sufficient to compel a finding of pater-
nity.93 The trial court had found nonpaternity, but the appellate court
held this finding to be so against the preponderance of the evidence as to
be manifestly unjust or clearly wrong.94 The blood tests, which indicated a
98.9% likelihood of paternity, strongly corroborated the mother's evidence
on material issues.95 The court specifically refused to follow the holding of
G- v. G- ,96 which had equated the percentage of likelihood of
paternity demonstrated by medical testimony with the probability that the
witness was telling the truth.97
A finding of adoption by estoppel requires clear evidence of an agree-
ment to adopt.98 In Brown v. Brown99 the court found no evidence of such
an agreement, although the child in question had lived with the Browns
for almost seventeen years. During that time the child's natural mother
had always refused to give her consent to an adoption. Her brother, the
alleged adoptive father, had also refused to consider terminating his sis-
ter's parental rights, although he would have liked to adopt the child. The
appellate court denied Mrs. Brown's request for child support, affirming
the trial court's finding that because the child had not been equitably
adopted, no children were born of the marriage.10
88. Id. at 1030.
89. Id. at 1030-31.
90. Id. at 1031.
91. Id.
92. 647 S.W.2d 74 (Tex. App.-San Antonio 1983, no writ).
93. Id. at 78-79.
94. Id. at 78.
95. Id.
96. 604 S.W.2d 521, 524 (Tex. Civ. App.-Dailas 1980, no writ).
97. 647 S.W.2d at 78.
98. Cavanaugh v. Davis, 149 Tex. 573, 577, 235 S.W.2d 972, 978 (1951).
99. 652 S.W.2d 828 (Tex. App.-Fort Worth 1983, writ dism'd).
100. Id. at 829.
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Texas courts continue to limit the rights of adopted persons. ' 0' In Foster
v. Foster 0 2 the court held that a person who was an adult when adopted
does not succeed to the same rights as a person who was a minor when
adopted. Citing no cases, the court held that "it is not the law of this State
that one who was adult when adopted has entitlement under the laws of
descent and distribution to recover as a child from anyone other than his
adoptive parents."' 0 3 This decision seems contrary to the language of the
adoption statute, which states that "the adopted adult is the son or daugh-
ter of the adoptive parents for all purposes . . . ." 04
IV. CONSERVATORSHIP
When parents divorce or die, the custody of their minor children be-
comes subject to a court's jurisdiction. Courts should give careful consid-
eration to the determination of managing conservatorship and should not
modify an agreed settlement solely on the hearsay testimony of one of the
parties, as the court did in Edwards v. Edwards. 0 5 There the appellate
court found that the trial court had erred in not granting a new trial when
the original judgment was obtained by extrinsic fraud perpetrated by the
wife. 106 Neither may a court base its conservatorship decision on consider-
ation of the sex of the parents, 0 7 as happened in Glud v. Glud. 0 8 The trial
court in Glud abused its discretion by sealing the record of the court's in-
terview with the children and denying the parties access to it. 109 This error
was curable by the appeals court's making the record available to the par-
ties."10 The trial court committed reversible error, however, by basing its
custody award to the mother on the belief that "it would be very difficult
for a man to raise two boys like a woman can. Therefore, I'm going to
name her as managing conservator of the children.""' The appellate
court held that the comment showed that the trial court's determination of
custody was based on the sex of the parents, thus depriving the father of
his right to have his qualifications as custodian considered without regard
to sex.112 Clerical errors can be corrected nunc pro tunc, as in Lane v.
Hart,113 where a dispute occurred about the interchangeability of the
101. Pouncy v. Garner, 626 S.W.2d 337 (Tex. App.-Tyler 1981, writ ref'd n.r.e.);
Solender, supra note 5, at 117.
102. 641 S.W.2d 693 (Tex. App.-Fort Worth 1982, no writ).
103. Id. at 695.
104. TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 16.55 (Vernon Pam. Supp. 1975-1983).
105. 651 S.W.2d 940 (Tex. App.-Fort Worth 1983, no writ).
106. Id. at 943. The wife misled the husband as to the date of the divorce hearing so that
she was the only party present.
107. TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 14.01(b) (Vernon 1975).
108. 641 S.W.2d 688 (Tex. App.-Waco 1982, no writ).
109. Id. at 689-90. "On the motion of a party ... the court shall cause a record of the
interview to be made. . . , which record of the interview shall be made part of the record in
the case." TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 14.07(c) (Vernon Pam. Supp. 1975-1983).
110. 641 S.W.2d at 690.
111. Id.
112. Id. at 690-91.
113. 651 S.W.2d 419 (Tex. App.-Eastland 1983, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
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words "residence" and "legal domicile."
When either of the parties to a divorce suit dies, the action abates and
the court should dismiss the suit. 1 4 In Whatley v. Bacon1 5 the Texas
Supreme Court issued a conditional writ of mandamus to Judge Bacon
asking that he vacate his temporary orders that had given conservatorship
to the children's maternal grandparents after their mother died. Since the
suit for divorce had abated, the orders could not have been issued pursuant
to that suit. 116 The father, as sole parent, was entitled to possession of the
children. 1 7 A similar result occurred in a clash between a mother and
stepmother after the father, the managing conservator, died. In Greene v.
Schublel 18 the Texas Supreme Court used its mandamus powers again to
order Judge Schuble to issue a writ of habeas corpus directing the step-
mother to surrender the children to their natural mother. The court held
that in the absence of specific provisions to the contrary, the death of the
managing conservator ends the conservatorship order and, therefore, the
surviving parent has a right to possession of the children. "i9 Three justices
dissented from this interpretation, asserting that the conservatorship ar-
rangement of the children should still be governed by the divorce court as
the court of continuing jurisdiction. 120
Perhaps if the father in Hernandez v. Valls '2' had availed himself of the
habeas corpus remedy 22 after his wife's death, he might have obtained
and maintained custody. Instead, he attempted to modify the divorce de-
cree in order to be declared managing conservator, and the maternal
grandparents, who had retained physical custody of the child, moved for a
transfer of venue to the county of their residence. The appellate court,
focusing on the transfer provisions of the Code,' 23 found that the children
had been with the grandparents for more than six months and ordered the
original divorce court, which had ruled for the father, to transfer the pro-
ceedings to the grandparents' county.' 24
The surviving parent cannot prevail, however, if valid orders concerning
114. Exparte Cahill, 286 S.W.2d 210, 215 (Tex. Civ. App.-Beaumont 1955, no writ).
115. 649 S.W.2d 297 (Tex. 1983).
116. Id. at 299.
117. TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 14.10(e) (Vernon Pam. Supp. 1975-1983). The grandpar-
ents may now sue for access to the children under the newly enacted § 14.03(d). See supra
notes 26-27 and accompanying text.
118. 654 S.W.2d 436 (Tex. 1983).
119. Id. at 437-38 (construing TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 14.10(e) (Vernon Pam. Supp.
1975-1983)).
120. 654 S.W.2d at 439 (Ray, J., dissenting).
121. 656 S.W.2d 153 (Tex. App.-San Antonio 1983, no writ).
122. TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 14.10(e) (Vernon Pam. Supp. 1975-1983) provides:
If the right to possession of a child is not governed by a court order, the court
in a habeas corpus proceeding . . . shall compel return of the child to the
relator if, and only if, it finds that the relator has a superior right to possession
of the child by virtue of the rights. . . of a parent as set forth in Section 12.04
of this code.
123. The Family Code provides for the transfer of a proceeding to the county in which
the child has resided for six months or longer. Id. § 11.06(b).
124. 656 S.W.2d at 155.
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custody of the child are in effect. In Mergerson v. Daggett 125 the Texas
Supreme Court vacated a habeas corpus order giving custody to the child's
natural mother because a valid temporary order had already been entered
in response to an original petition by the child's aunt.126 Thus, the child's
custody was governed by a valid court order, and the natural parent did
not have a superior right.' 27 In fact, the Texas Supreme Court has contin-
ued to use its mandamus power to enforce the rights of managing conser-
vators to possession of their children. 28 In addition, the court has when
necessary enforced the mandatory transfer provision of the Code,' 29 point-
ing out that while a transfer order is interlocutory, it is final as to the trans-
ferring judge. ' 30
While the new sections of the Code expanding grandparents' rights had
not taken effect during the survey period,'31 grandparents have neverthe-
less been increasingly active in asserting their rights to visit or have cus-
tody of their grandchildren. In Exparte Parker 32 the father, as possessory
conservator, filed a writ of habeas corpus, which the trial court denied. His
former wife, the managing conservator, was in jail, and her parents had
possession of the children. Unfortunately, the father filed for a writ of
mandamus in the court of civil appeals, which at the time did not have the
power to compel the trial court to grant the writ. 133 Apparently the legisla-
ture has remedied this lack of power in the past session.' 34 In three other
cases the grandparents were able to assert their right to become managing
conservators of their grandchildren as against the natural parents. 35
125. 644 S.W.2d 451 (Tex. 1982).
126. Id. at 452. TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 11.06(a) (Vernon 1975) provides:
If the right to possession of a child is presently governed by a court order, the
court in a habeas corpus proceeding involving the right to possession of the
child shall compel return of the child to the relator if and only if it finds that
the relator is presently entitled to possession by virtue of the court order.
127. 644 S.W.2d at 452.
128. See Schoenfeld v. Onion, 647 S.W.2d 954, 955 (Tex. 1983) (court reiterated that
order denying habeas corpus because of best interest of child may not be used as device to
avoid mandate of Family Code § 14.10); see also Wise v. Yates, 639 S.W.2d 460, 461 (Tex.
1982) (court upheld Virginia custody order, holding that fact that mother might take chil-
dren to Taiwan was not threat to children's welfare under § 14.10(c)).
129. TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 11.06 (Vernon Pam. Supp. 1975-1983).
130. Seay v. Valderas, 643 S.W.2d 395, 397 (Tex. 1982).
131. See supra notes 26-27 and accompanying text.
132. 643 S.W.2d 476 (Tex. App.-Tyler 1982, no writ).
133. Courts of appeals may issue writs of mandamus only to enforce their jurisdiction or
to compel a trial judge to proceed to trial and judgment. State Bar v. Heard, 603 S.W.2d
829, 833 (Tex. 1980); TEX. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. arts. 1823-1824 (Vernon 1964).
134. The legislature recently extended the mandamus power of the courts of civil appeals
under art. 1824 to "all writs of Mandamus agreeable to the principles of law regulating such
writs." Act of June 19, 1983, ch. 839, § 3, 1983 Tex. Gen. Laws 4767, 4768-69.
135. Herod v. Davidson, 650 S.W.2d 501, 503 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1983, no
writ) (grandparents had standing to intervene to ask for managing conservatorship when
they had had physical custody for two years); Yancey v. Koonce, 645 S.W.2d 861, 863-64
(Tex. App.-El Paso 1983, writ ref'd n.r.e.) (court found best interest of child would be
served.by appointing maternal grandparents managing conservators; mother and former
managing conservator concurred, as against father and paternal grandparents); In re JW.,
645 S.W.2d 340, 341-42 (Tex. App.-Amarillo 1982, writ ref'd n.r.e.) (paternal grandparent
had standing to intervene and be appointed managing conservator for child of divorced
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The standard for modifying a divorce decree as to managing conserva-
torship requires that conditions have so materially changed that retention
of the present managing conservator would be injurious to the child and
that the appointment of a new managing conservator would be a positive
improvement. 36 This standard is difficult to meet, and before a court can
make such a modification the managing conservator is entitled to notice.137
A drastic change in the visitation and support provisions of a decree, even
without a change in the designation of the managing conservator, cannot
stand absent a showing of a material change.' 38 The courts have held that
a mother's having a job that left her with less time to spend with her chil-
dren was not a material change 139 and that a stepmother's prior miscon-
duct was also not a basis for a change. 40 When the trial court finds,
however, that a substantial change has occurred and that the change is
detrimental to the child, the appeals court will affirm unless the finding is
against the great weight of the evidence.141 Where an increase in visitation
is sought, in the absence of a complete record the appeals courts will not
substitute its judgment for that of the trial court.' 42 Additionally, courts
have continuing jurisdiction to modify pre-1974 divorce decrees if the
court's jurisdiction has been invoked subsequent to 1974.143
In the only interstate decision of the survey period, the court in McGee v.
McGee' 44 held that although the trial court lacked personal jurisdiction
over the father, the Parental Kidnapping Prevention Act of 1980145 and the
Texas jurisdictional statutes 46 nevertheless permitted the court to modify
a visitation order entered in a Mississippi divorce decree. All parties had
moved from Mississippi. Although the father was a resident of Oklahoma,
the mother and children had lived in Texas since mid-1980, enabling
parents, since she had previously been appointed either temporary managing or possessory
conservator).
136. TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 14.08(c)(1) (Vernon Pam. Supp. 1975-1983); see also Jones
v. Cable, 626 S.W.2d 734, 736 (Tex. 1982) (interpreting § 14.08(c)(1)).
137. Allen v. Allen, 647 S.W.2d 356, 361 (Tex. App.-El Paso 1982, no writ).
138. Werlein v. Werlein, 652 S.W.2d 538, 539-40 (Tex. App.-Houston [Ist Dist.] 1983,
no writ).
139. Vasquez v. Vasquez, 645 S.W.2d 573, 575 (Tex. App.-El Paso 1983, writ refd
n.r.e.).
140. Hollon v. Rethaber, 643 S.W.2d 783, 785 (Tex. App.-San Antonio 1982, no writ).
141. Gibbs v. Greenwood, 651 S.W.2d 377, 381 (Tex. App.-Austin 1983, no writ).
142. Maixner v. Maixner, 641 S.W.2d 374, 376 (Tex. App.-Dallas 1982, no writ).
143. Sawa v. Williams, 656 S.W.2d 204 (Tex. App.-San Antonio 1983, no writ). An
enactment provision of the 1973 amendment of § 3.55 of the Family Code indicated that an
action commenced after January 1, 1974, involving the modification of an order, judgment,
or decree affecting the parent-child relationship shall be treated as the commencement of a
suit in which no court has continuing jurisdiction. Act of June 15, 1973, ch. 543, § 4(b), 1973
Tex. Gen. Laws 1451, 1459. The mother in Sawa claimed that the father's failure to file an
original petition, rather than a motion to modify custody and support, denied the court
jurisdiction since the divorce was granted in 1972. The court held that the entry of an
agreed order in 1976 invoked the court's continuous jurisdiction. 656 S.W.2d at 205-06.
144. 651 S.W.2d 891 (Tex. App.-El Paso 1983, no writ).
145. 28 U.S.C. § 1738A (Supp. V 1981).
146. Act of June 13, 1979, ch. 584, § 1, 1979 Tex. Gen. Laws 1201, 1201-02, repealed by
Uniform Child Custody Jurisdiction Act, ch. 160, § 10, 1983 Tex. Gen. Laws 691, 709 (sub-
stituting TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. §§ 11.05, .53 (Vernon Pam. Supp. 1975-1983)).
1984]
SO UTHWESTERN LAW JO URNAL
Texas courts to acquire jurisdiction over matters concerning the parent-
child relationship. 147 The opinion is interesting because it contains cita-
tions to much of the literature on interstate jurisdiction in child custody
matters. 148
V. SUPPORT
While both parents have a duty to support their children, 14 9 it is not
necessarily an abuse of discretion for a trial court to refuse to award child
support to the managing conservator husband. In Ulrich v. Ulrich ' 50 the
parties' earnings were approximately equal, but the wife was contemplat-
ing a return to school. The trial court order gave the husband exclusive
use of the homestead and the wife visitation rights with no support at-
tached. The court of appeals affirmed this order because it appeared that
the trial court had taken the entire circumstances of the parties into consid-
eration in arriving at its decision not to require child support from the
wife. 151 The appellate court distinguished the case at hand from Gran-
dine/ti v. Grandinetti, 52 where the wife had indicated both an ability and a
willingness to pay child support. 53 In Ulrich no such willingness or abil-
ity was clearly evident.
A trial court has wide discretion in setting the amount of child support
and is not required to order the maximum amount possible. 5 4 For exam-
ple, even though the court has found that the husband has the ability to
pay $1300 per month in support, it may order only $1100 per month after
taking into consideration the standard of living that the family and the
child have maintained. 155 Once a divorce decree is signed, temporary or-
ders are no longer effective, and a trial court can either suspend or refuse
to suspend its final support orders pending appeal. '5 6 A court cannot, how-
ever, reinstate its temporary orders. 57
Once an original order of support has been entered, the court may, upon
proper motion, modify its orders if it finds a change of circumstances has
occurred.158 Trial courts also may award attorney's fees' 59 and need not
147. 651 S.W.2d at 893.
148. See id.
149. TEX. FAM. CODE AN. § 4.02 (Vernon Supp. 1984).
150. 652 S.W.2d 503 (Tex. App.-Houston list Dist.] 1983, no writ).
151. Id. at 505-06.
152. 600 S.W.2d 371 (Tex. Civ. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1980, no writ).
153. Id. at 372, cited in Ulrich, 652 S.W.2d at 505-06.
154. Woods v. Woods, 619 S.W.2d 590, 592 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1981, no
writ).
155. Vautrain v. Vautrain, 646 S.W.2d 309, 312-13 (Tex. App.-Fort Worth 1983, writ
dism'd).
156. TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 11.19(c) (Vernon Pam. Supp. 1975-1983).
157. Morris v. Morris, 654 S.W.2d 789, 790-91 (Tex. App.-Tyler 1983, no writ).
158. Cannon v. Cannon, 646 S.W.2d 295, 297-98 (Tex. App.-Tyler 1983, no writ) (suffi-
cient evidence of material change in circumstances to sustain increase in child support from
$100 to $170 per month).
159. Laviage v. Laviage, 647 S.W.2d 758, 761 (Tex. App.-Tyler 1983, no writ).
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follow the findings of a jury in setting the amount of child support, 160 since
a jury verdict on child support is merely advisory. 16 1 In Smith v. Smith,162
however, the appeals court held that the trial court had abused its discre-
tion by ordering the mother to pay twenty-five dollars a month, or only
one percent of her gross annual salary from her primary job, as child sup-
port for her teenage son. The court held this amount to be a token pay-
ment rather than support. 163 The court in Orsak v. Orsak'64 held that
when each parent is named managing conservator of one of the parties'
two children the court may order that each be solely responsible for the
support of only the child who is in his or her custody. The appellate court
stated that the trial court need not order cross support in order to maintain
a statutory duty of support for both children by both parents, because the
trial court may later modify its decree in the event of a change in
circumstances. 65
Carroll v. Jones166 illustrates the difficulty of finding a court with juris-
diction to modify a support decree when both of the parties move fre-
quently. The parties were divorced in Florida and the mother and
children moved to Texas, where the father submitted to the jurisdiction of
the court for an order reducing his child support. The mother and children
then moved to Colorado, and the father moved first to Georgia, where he
was served, and then to Alaska. The Texas court held that it lacked sub-
ject matter jurisdiction because none of the parties still resided in Texas. 167
The mother sought to avoid this ruling by contending that because she was
an air force wife, she could retain a Texas domicile. The court deemed this
argument irrelevant since the jurisdiction statute then in effect used the
words "principal residence" and not "domicile."'' 68
When the change in residence relates to an intrastate change, however,
the outcome can be quite different. In that situation not only do the courts
have jurisdiction, but venue also lies where the children reside. In Leonard
v. Paxson ' 69 the Texas Supreme Court granted a conditional writ of man-
damus to transfer the proceedings for a motion to modify from El Paso
County to Galveston County, where the children were then residing and
had resided for more than six months. The trial judge had held that a
contractual venue agreement between the parties prevented the Family
160. Havis v. Havis, 651 S.W.2d 921 (Tex. App.-Corpus Christi 1983, no writ).
161. TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 11.13(b) (Vernon Pam.Supp. 1975-1983).
162. 651 S.W.2d 953 (Tex. App.-Fort Worth 1983, no writ).
163. Id. at 955.
164. 642 S.W.2d 566 (Tex. App.-Dallas 1982, no writ).
165. Id. at 568.
166. 654 S.W.2d 54 (Tex. App.-Fort Worth 1982, no writ).
167. Id. at 56.
168. Act of June 13, 1979, ch. 584, § 3, 1979 Tex. Gen. Laws 1201, 1202, repealed by
Uniform Child Custody Jurisdiction Act, ch. 160, § 10, 1983 Tex. Gen. Laws 691, 709. The
former statute provided that "a court may not exercise its continuing jurisdiction to modify
.. any part of a decree if all of the parties and the child have established and continue to
maintain theirprincipal residence outside this state." Act of June 13, 1979, ch. 584, § 3, 1979
Tex. Gen. Laws 1201, 1202 (emphasis added) (repealed 1983).
169. 654 S.W.2d 440 (Tex. 1983).
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Code's mandatory transfer provisions 70 from taking effect. The supreme
court pointed out that this suit was not on a contract but rather was a suit
affecting the parent-child relationship and thus the transfer provisions of
the Family Code controlled. 71 To hold otherwise would have defeated
the legislature's intent. 72
In Huff Y. Hujff 7 3 the Texas Supreme Court held that the ten-year stat-
ute of limitations 174 applies to the enforcement of judgments of child sup-
port. Thus, a motion to reduce arrearages to judgment may apply to the
prior ten years, but to no earlier period. The court in Huff reasoned that
the motion to reduce arrearages to judgment is but one of several means
provided by the legislature to enforce judgments of child support, 175 and
that such motions under the law of res judicata are not separate claims that
would come under the general four-year statute. 176 Each claim as it comes
due is not a final judgment, but rather is nonmodifiable because the trial
court has no jurisdiction to modify support payments retroactively. 177
Parties have a right to be heard on the issue of arrearages not as a matter
of relitigating the claim of support, but as a matter of due process in the
presentation of defenses. 178
A motion to reduce child support to judgment is a remedy separate from
a motion for contempt, and a court cannot enter such a judgment absent a
pleading or a prayer to support it. 179 To be certain that a complete remedy
is obtained, the attorney should file a motion for contempt and a motion to
reduce the arrearages to judgment simultaneously. 8 0 A court cannot re-
fuse to grant a money judgment for arrearages, because such refusal would
constitute a prohibited retroactive modification. 181 In addition to granting
the judgment for arrearages, the court could also find the obligor in con-
tempt, but it could not forgive the arrearage, since that had become a
money judgment. It could, however, frame the contempt order to take in
onlypart of the arrearage so that even if the relator claimed it was impossi-
ble for him to pay all the arrearages, he would not be released.' 82
170. TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 11.06(b) (Vernon Pam. Supp. 1975-1983).
171. 654 S.W.2d at 441.
172. Id. at 441-42.
173. 648 S.W.2d 286 (Tex. 1983).
174. TEX. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 5532 (Vernon 1958).
175. 648 S.W.2d at 289; see TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 14.09 (Vernon 1975 & Pam. Supp.
1975-1983).
176. 648 S.W.2d at 289; see TEX. REV. CIV. STAT. ANN. art. 5529 (Vernon 1958).
177. 648 S.W.2d at 289 n.8; see TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 14.08(c)(2) (Vernon Pam. Supp.
1975-1983).
178. 648 S.W.2d at 289.
179. Barnett v. Barnett, 640 S.W.2d 776, 777 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1982, no
writ).
180. See Holliday v. Holliday, 642 S.W.2d 280 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1982,
no writ). The court in Holliday denied a motion to reduce arrearages of $4000 to judgment
because one month prior the obligor had been held in contempt and had purged himself by
paying $2000 of the $6050 in arrears. The court incorrectly reasoned that by permitting the
obligor to purge himself the slate was wiped clean of all arrearages. Id. at 282.
181. Huff v. Huff, 648 S.W.2d 286, 289 n.8 (Tex. 1983).
182. Exparte Raymer, 644 S.W.2d 889, 891 (Tex. App.-Amarillo 1982, no writ).
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Courts that do not meet prescribed formalities in their efforts to enforce
support risk having their orders voided. Contempt citations should give
notice of what act is required, 183 the show cause order should give ade-
quate notice of the charges and should be properly served, 184 and the un-
derlying decree must have ordered payment of support. 85 If, however, a
husband, with his attorney present, testifies without objection that he is in
arrears, after tendering the arrearage to the court, the court may still find
him in criminal contempt. 86 The contemnor cannot then claim a privilege
against self-incrimination, since the privilege is not self-executing. 87 In
some circumstances it is possible to sever a portion of the order of con-
tempt and sustain a portion of it. Such a severance occurred in Ex parte
Fernandez, 88 where the support order was void because it included sup-
port for a child who was not a minor, as well as for one who was, but did
not separate the amounts. 89 Because the portion of the order relating to
the return of items of furniture was specific, however, the contempt order
could be sustained and the habeas corpus writ denied. 90
Autry v. Autry 9 1 is a case that the author hopes will be one of a kind.
The obligor, the father, was in arrears for child support in the sum of
$3200. Apparently the mother had made a number of attempts to collect
this sum, requiring the father to hire counsel to defend himself. He then
filed a separate action for attorney's fees in the amount of $4000. The
court granted this petition even though the award was not connected with
any other proceeding. The appellate court reversed, holding that section
11.18 of the Family Code192 supports no separate cause of action for attor-
ney's fees. 193
When a divorce decree, like the one in Hudspeth v. Stoker, 194 provides
that a group life insurance policy be maintained and its proceeds held in
trust for the children, numerous changes in carriers under the same em-
ployer do not defeat the trust. 95 The changes in carrier in Hudspeth were
totally at the option of the employer, and after one of the changes the
owner-father attempted to thwart the child support agreement by designat-
ing his second wife as the beneficiary. The court held that such actions
would not defeat the equitable rights of the children and imposed a con-
183. Exparte Martin, 652 S.W.2d 826, 828 (Tex. App.-Fort Worth 1983, no writ).
184. Exparte Combs, 638 S.W.2d 540, 541 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1982, no
writ).
185. Exparte Harris, 649 S.W.2d 389 (Tex. App.-Corpus Christi 1983, no writ).
186. Exparte Tankersly, 650 S.W.2d 550, 551 (Tex. App.-Fort Worth 1983, no writ).
187. Id.
188. 645 S.W.2d 636 (Tex. App.-El Paso 1983, no writ).
189. Id. at 639.
190. Id.
191. 646 S.W.2d 586 (Tex. App.-Tyler 1983, no writ).
192. TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 11.18(a) (Vernon Pam. Supp. 1975-1983) provides that in
"any proceeding under this subtitle . . . the court may award costs. Reasonable attorney's
fees may be taxed as costs . (Emphasis added.)
193. 646 S.W.2d at 589.
194. 644 S.W.2d 92 (Tex. App.-San Antonio 1982, no writ).
195. Id. at 95.
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structive trust for the original face amount of the decree. 96
In Kennard v. McCray 197 the court held that an agreement to release the
father from his child support obligations in exchange for an assignment of
certain royalty rights was void as against public policy since it had not
been approved by the courts.l98 The father's second wife, however, could
not avail herself of the court to recover the royalty rights because she stood
in the shoes of the obligor in her attempt to void the agreement.199 Courts
will leave the parties to executed illegal contracts in the positions in which
they have voluntarily placed themselves.2°°
In Saunders v. Saunders 20 a wife who had left her Texas husband to live
in Pennsylvania used the Uniform Reciprocal Enforcement of Support Act
(URESA) 20 2 to obtain support for her child. The husband attempted to
deny paternity, but the court would not hear his testimony as to non-
access. 20 3 Unfortunately for the husband, he failed to preserve the point
for appeal by omitting to make a bill of exceptions. 2°4 The appeal did
contend that his sixth amendment right20 5 to confront the witnesses against
him had been denied, but the appeals court pointed out that this right
applies only in criminal cases, whereas URESA is civil in nature. 20 6 Sus-
taining the right to confront accusers would of course defeat the entire
purpose of URESA, which is intended to allow parties in different parts of
the country to establish their rights in relation to support without leaving
home. The putative father in Saunders also complained that the trial court
relied on hearsay evidence when it admitted the mother's petition. The
court held that the petition merely served to establish a prima facie case
and that the father had the burden to confirm or deny the facts alleged
therein. 20 7 Since the father testified to essentially the same facts as were
contained in the petition, the trial court did not rely on the petition for its
judgment, so the question of hearsay regarding the petition facts was irrel-
evant.20 8 This case serves to illustrate that URESA is a cumbersome
mechanism at best and, until it is better understood, will be subject to
many appeals that can only delay the implementation of valid support
orders.
VI. TERMINATION AND ADOPTION
The Family Code requires that in any suit seeking termination of the
196. Id. at 96.
197. 648 S.W.2d 743 (Tex. App.-Tyler 1983, writ refd n.r.e.).
198. Id. at 745.
199. Id. at 746.
200. Id.
201. 650 S.W.2d 534 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1983, no writ).
202. TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. §§21.01-.45 (Veron 1975 & Pam. Supp. 1975-1983).
203. 650 S.W.2d at 537-38.
204. Id. at 538.
205. U.S. CONST. amend. VI.
206. 650 S.W.2d at 538.
207. Id. at 537.
208. Id.
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parent-child relationship, the court must appoint a guardian ad litem for
the child unless it is clear that the child can be adequately represented by a
party to the suit. 20 9 In Barfeld v. White 210 a jury trial took place and the
father strongly contested the termination of his parental rights. The jury
found that the father had failed to support the child in accordance with his
ability, and the trial court terminated his parental rights. The trial court,
however, failed to appoint a guardian ad litem, and the court of appeals
held such failure to be reversible error.21" The appellate court rejected the
trial court's finding that the child's interests were adequately represented
when each of the parties was vigorously advocating his or her own inter-
ests.212 In Turner v. Lutz 213 the court reached a similar conclusion, al-
though the trial court had made no finding as to the adequacy of the
child's representation.214 The appellees in Turner asserted that the failure
to appoint a guardian ad litem was harmless error, but the court pointed
out that the requirement is mandatory and thus cannot be harmless. 215
The failure to appoint a guardian ad litem was not reversible error in In re
D.E W., 21 6 however, since the termination of the father's rights was based
on his voluntary relinquishment. 217 Thus the trial court's finding that the
mother could adequately represent the child's interest was credible. The
father also asserted that the lack of a trial record, in the absence of evi-
dence that he waived his right to one, denied him due process.218 The
court found that the affidavit of relinquishment itself was a sufficient rec-
ord, obviating the need for a record of the trial or a statement of facts.
219
The father also asserted that the execution of the affidavit of relinquish-
ment was faulty. While not disputing that he had understood and signed
the affidavit, the father claimed that no evidence showed that he had
signed it in the presence of the witnesses and the notary. The court held
that the physical presence of the witnesses and notary when the document
is signed is not necessary. The affiant satisfied the essential requirements
when he appeared personally before the notary and the notary verified the
signatures. 220
In Rhoades v. Penfold221 a different kind of right to representation was
questioned. In that case both parents' parental rights were terminated in
209. TEX. FAM. CODE ANNm4. § 11.10(a) (Vernon Pam. Supp. 1975-1983).
210. 647 S.W.2d 407 (Tex. App.-Austin 1983, no writ).
211. Id. at 409.
212. Id.
213. 654 S.W.2d 57 (Tex. App.-Austin 1983, no writ).
214. Id. at 58-59.
215. Id. at 59.
216. 654 S.W.2d 33 (Tex. App.-Fort Worth 1983, no writ).
217. Id. at 35 (citing TEx. FAM. CODE ANN. § 15.03 (Vernon 1975 & Pam. Supp. 1975-
1983)).
218. 654 S.W.2d at 35.
219. Id. The court relied on Brown v. McLennan County Children's Protective Servs.,
627 S.W.2d 390, 394 (Tex. 1982), which found legislative intent that the affidavit of relin-
quishment be a sufficient basis for a termination finding.
220. 654 S.W.2d at 36.
221. 694 F.2d 1043 (5th Cir. 1983).
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an action by the state. Although the court informed the parents that they
had a right to counsel, it did not advise them that counsel would be ap-
pointed for them if they could not afford to pay. The mother then filed suit
in federal court asking that the state's judgment be declared null and void,
alleging that the failure to appoint counsel had deprived her of due pro-
cess.222 The district court certified a class action and rendered summary
judgment for the mother. The Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals reversed and
remanded, pointing out, first, that certification of a class was improper be-
cause the United States Supreme Court had held that the right to counsel
in parent-child terminations exists on an individual basis, rather than be-
ing an across-the-board right.223 Second, because the district court had
never litigated the question of indigency or even considered the evidence
on this point, summary judgment could not be granted.224
The usual ground for termination of parental rights in intra-family
adoptions is failure to support in accordance with ability. 225 This was the
ground for termination in both Neiswander v. Bailey226 and In re S.K.S. 227
In the latter case the court also found that the appellant, who was in jail at
the time of the termination trial and therefore could not appear personally,
had no constitutional right to appear personally when he had been repre-
sented by counsel and had had adequate opportunity to appear by deposi-
tion.228 In two other cases courts terminated parental rights of fathers who
were prisoners. The court in Wray v. Lenderman229 affirmed a jury verdict
favoring termination, despite the fact that the appellees could not afford to
contest the appeal. The court found that the evidence showed the father
had engaged in a course of conduct that had the effect of endangering the
well-being of the child.2 30 The father's criminal activities during the mi-
nor's lifetime could only result in the father's incarceration. 23' While the
criminal conduct in itself evidenced a disregard for the minor's well-being,
other evidence indicated that the father also had a violent temper and a
drinking problem. G. WH v. D.A.H.232 involved similar circumstances in
that the father was in prison, but less additional evidence indicated the
222. The mother based her appeal on 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (Supp. V 1981) since the denial of
counsel was done under color of state law.
223. 694 F.2d at 1049-50 (citing Lassiter v. Department of Social Servs., 452 U.S. 18
(1981)).
224. 694 F.2d at 1048-49.
225. TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 15.02(l)(F) (Vernon Pam. Supp. 1975-1983).
226. 645 S.W.2d 835 (Tex. App.-Dallas 1982, no writ). The father in Neiswander had
been ordered to pay $20 per week in 1968, but he had failed to pay anything at all for over a
decade. The court also discussed the standard of review for termination cases and held that
the standard should be "whether the trier of fact could reasonably conclude that the exist-
ence of the fact is highly probable." Id. at 836. This standard is higher than the preponder-
ance standard of ordinary civil proceedings. Id. at 835-36.
227. 648 S.W.2d 402 (Tex. App.-San Antonio 1983, no writ).
228. Id. at 405.
229. 640 S.W.2d 68 (Tex. App.-Tyler 1982, no writ).
230. Id. at 71-72; see TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 15.02(l)(E) (Vernon Pam. Supp. 1975-
1983).
231. 640 S.W.2d at 71-72.
232. 650 S.W.2d 480 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1983, no writ).
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father had actually endangered the child. The father alleged that his ter-
mination of parental rights was based solely on his conviction for a single
offense, the murder of a young woman. The court agreed that such a con-
viction would not be sufficient to sustain the allegations, but found other
noncriminal conduct of the father sufficient to warrant termination.233 A
vigorous dissent argued that the evidence against the father did not meet
the clear and convincing standard of proof.234
When the state intervenes to take custody of a child, the standard for
naming the state managing conservator is merely a preponderance of the
evidence rather than the clear and convincing standard required in the
termination of parental rights.235 The state must produce some evidence,
however, to rebut the presumption that it is in the best interest of the child
for the natural parents to retain custody.236 In Bryant v. Hibber237 the
court found a sufficient basis in the evidence to terminate the mother's
parental rights. Despite the mother's apparent true affection for her chil-
dren, she had allowed them to remain in environments that endangered
their well-being.238 Additionally, in Bryant the attorney ad litem con-
tended that no evidence supported the $250 amount of attorney's fees
awarded by the court. The appellate court sustained the amount because
the attorney, in her request for $4025, had merely included the number of
hours expended rather than the necessity for and nature and quality of the
work.2
39
In re S.D. S. 240 was another case in which the trial court found the
mother had allowed the children to remain in a dangerous environment.
The father was convicted of child abuse and in a plea bargain voluntarily
relinquished his rights. The mother's rights were terminated, however, be-
cause although she had not herself endangered the children, her concern
for them was untimely and by the time she took action to help, they had
suffered too much.24' The dissent pointed out that a factor in the mother's
reticence was her great fear of her husband. She was not free to leave the
house with both children, so one child was essentially held as a hostage. 242
Rodriguez v. Miles243 involved two sets of foster parents who wished to
adopt the same child. The appellees had filed for adoption first, but the
Department of Human Resources (DHR) filed a consent to adoption for
the appellants and intervened in opposition to the appellees. The trial
233. Id. at 481-82.
234. Id. at 482-84 (Murphy, J., dissenting).
235. Choyce v. Dallas County Child Welfare Unit, 642 S.W.2d 559, 560 (Tex. App.-
Dallas 1982, no writ).
236. Id. at 561.
237. 639 S.W.2d 718 (Tex. App.-Austin 1982, no writ).
238. The court found the children's environment to include illicit drugs, overdoses, fire-
arms, arrest, prostitution, and possible sexual abuse.
239. Id. at 720-21.
240. 648 S.W.2d 351 (Tex. App.-Fort Worth 1983, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
241. Id. at 353.
242. Id. at 353-54 (Jordan, J., dissenting).
243. 655 S.W.2d 245 (Tex. App.-Corpus Christi 1983, no writ).
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court found for the appellees and ruled that the requirement of consent by
the managing conservator,244 the DHR, should be waived.245 The appel-
lants contended that appellees had no standing to petition for adoption,
but the court found, in accordance with the Family Code,246 that after a
termination of parental rights any adult has standing to adopt a child. 247
The appellate court also affirmed the trial court's holding on waiver of
consent, since it had found that the DHR did not have good cause for its
refusal to consent. 248 The appellants having shown no abuse of discretion,
the decision of the trial court was affirmed.
244. TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 16.05 (Vernon 1975).
245. 655 S.W.2d at 219; see TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 16.05(d) (Vernon 1975).
246. See TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 16.02 (Vernon 1975).
247. 655 S.W.2d at 247-48.
248. Id. at 249.
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